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Using a cross-sectional survey of two sampled counties in Kenya, this article analyses 
whether social networking sites reflect social network heterogeneity. It then examines 
how social network heterogeneity influences polarisation in Kenya. Three types of 
polarisation are examined: party, ethnic and ideological (around county resources). 
The study focuses specifically on the public WhatsApp platform (the most popular 
SNS in Kenya). To assess this empirical data, theoretical perspectives are drawn from 
the literatures on incidental and selective exposure and their impact on political 
polarisation. The findings indicate that the randomised composition of a WhatsApp 
group through public links indeed reflects social network heterogeneity. The findings 
further show that posting political news, obtaining political news and commenting on 
political news influence social network heterogeneity to some degree. This social 
network heterogeneity was also found to influence all three (party, ideological and 
ethnic) types of polarisation in varying but significant degrees.  
Keywords: heterogeneity; polarisation; social networking sites; political discussion 
 
Introduction 
Scholars of communication, social movements and political participation have studied the 
role of social networking sites (SNSs) as possible instigators of political polarisation (Ji 2017; 
Loader, Vromen, and Xenos 2014; Osatuyi 2013; Valenzuela, Arriagada, and Scherman 
2012). Baek (2015) argues that due to its nature and characteristics, social networking sites 
provide ideal platforms for examining correlations between exposure to political 
communications and the degree of polarisation. This is because they are platforms of 
information exchange, social interaction and political discussion (Buglass et al. 2017; 
Thelwall 2009). The critical question at the heart of many such studies has been whether 
social networking platforms intensify or ameliorate levels of polarisation in various 
sociopolitical contexts (Arceneaux and Johnson 2010; Pattie and Johnston 2016). Two 
competing perspectives have emerged both with fairly distinct diagnosis and conclusions. 
 
The first states that individuals, through the process of selective exposure, are more likely to 
seek like-minded viewpoints. Consequently, they tend to avoid divergent political 
perspectives (Arceneaux and Johnson 2010; Pattie and Johnston 2016) and strengthen pre-
existing opinions and prejudices (Stroud 2010). This phenomenon is further aggravated by 
features of social networking sites which serve as echo chambers of individuals’ preferred 
opinions (Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2013). The second, alternative, perspective argues 
that social networking sites actually expose individuals to diverse views which then serve to 
increase tolerance and moderate their political opinions and ideological polarisation (Ahn 
2012; Nir 2011). Research on social networking sites has shown that they afford users 
adaptable and flexible communication opportunities that would otherwise be lacking in 
ordinary social and political settings (Min 2010).  
 
Our study extends the boundaries of existing research both technologically and 
geographically by examining these perspectives in the context of WhatsApp discussions on 
local Kenyan politics—a country seen as having high levels of polarisation. The research 
sought to understand the following: how WhatsApp, as a social networking site, is reflective 
of the social network heterogeneity of its users; how usage of social networking sites, 
(posting, obtaining and commenting on political news), influences social network 
heterogeneity; and whether any association exists between social network heterogeneity and 
polarisation. These objectives were addressed by employing a cross-sectional survey of 
young voters in Nairobi and Nakuru counties.  
 
The study concludes that both perspectives outlined above are to some extent tenable. 
Whether individuals use social networking sites as echo chambers for selective exposure or 
as platforms for enhancing diversity of opinions and perspectives depends on a number of 
factors. These include, first, the interactive dynamics within the social networking sites, an 
example being the SNSs platform’s affordances/features and how individuals can join, access 
or connect with heterogeneous others. The second factor concerns the discursive culture 
characterised by group dynamics and how participants interact in the context of such 
dynamics (Pattie and Johnston 2016; Stroud 2010).  
 
Contextual Perspective of Polarisation in Kenya 
Polarisation in Kenya is largely founded on the colonial indiscriminate creation of states 
during the scramble for Africa (Branch and Cheeseman 2006). Different ethnic groups with 
 
varied forms of culture, language and sociocultural beliefs were huddled together and then 
expected to establish integrated nation states (Zeleza 2010). Kenya is, therefore, a multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-racial society. In addition, the British 
administrative policy of “divide and rule”—playing one ethnic community off against 
another—also formed part of the entrenched post-independence culture (Kanyinga 2014). 
The situation was further aggravated after independence when leaders of independent Kenya 
adopted the same pragmatic, divisive and often ruinous policies established by colonialists 
(Berg-Schlosser 1982; Kanyinga 2014). Ideological differences between the KANU and 
KADU parties, ethnic fragmentation, unaddressed historical injustices and inequality in 
resource distribution became Kenya’s bane (Berg-Schlosser 1982; Cheeseman, Lynch, and 
Willis 2014; Kabiri 2014). The presidential system promoted hotly contested elections and 
facilitated a climate of zero-sum contestation where the winner takes all in terms of state 
resources (Carrier and Kochore 2014). Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis (2014) note how 
political elites exploited the marginalisation, exclusion and perceived state discrimination to 
incite violence around election periods. Sporadic violence resulting from ethnic cleavages 
have often accompanied Kenya’s quest for justice, retribution and national healing (Hassan 
2015). The post-election violence that followed the 2007/8 General Election nearly saw the 
nation torn apart (Halakhe 2013). Looking back at this election, there is widespread 
agreement that the introduction of democratic competition in societies divided by race, 
ethnicity, or religion can increase the risk of inter-communal violence (Mutahi and Kimari 
2017). Moreover, it can be argued that because of the strong association between ethnicity 
and trust, ethnic communities associated with the leading parties internalise messages offered 
by distinct sets of political elites during campaigns. The result is that negative ethnic appeals 
exacerbate divisions across communities during such periods (Kanyinga 2014). As a result, a 
new constitutional dispensation was prescribed as a panacea to Kenya’s historical injustices, 
inequality, political marginalisation and malfunctioning institutions (World Bank 2012). This 
prescription was part of recommendations made by a post-election commission (Kagwanja 
and Southall 2009). One of the key proposed solutions was the devolution of political powers 
and decentralisation of decision making to counties. According to Kramon and Posner 
(2015), the challenges of centralisation gradually led to serious and corrosive grievances 
about citizen exclusion from the governance process (Long, Kanyinga, and Ferree 2013). 
Looking at the 2013 and 2017 general elections, it is clear that polarisation still exists within 
the state polity. Furthermore, this may have been worsened by the resource governance 
processes at the county level (CRECO 2014). The amplification of such polarisation is still 
 
evident in social networking sites in Kenya (Kamau 2017). The question, therefore, is 
whether the composition and discussions in such digital platforms reflect, instigate or merely 
project sociopolitical polarisation in Kenya. 
 
Technology, Polarisation and the Rise of WhatsApp in Kenya  
The possibility of technological developments adding to traditional polarisation in Kenya is 
increasingly important to consider given the significant growth of Internet platforms in the 
past decade. According to the Communication Authority of Kenya, mobile phone penetration 
is over 90 per cent (2017) while Internet penetration in 2017 stood at 89.4 per cent (Africa 
Internet Users 2017). Kenya’s broadband market has been transformed by a combination of 
increased investments in network upgrades (Souter and Kerrets-Makau 2012) alongside the 
landing of four fibre-optic submarine cables (Africa Internet Users 2017). Increased 
international bandwidth resulted in a decrease in wholesale prices, which helped make 
broadband services affordable for mass audiences (Fraenkel 2014). The rapid upward trend in 
Internet penetration may be attributed to increased access to low-cost smartphones (Souter 
and Kerrets-Makau 2012), and the competitive pricing of data bundles by mobile phone 
companies (Africa Internet Users 2017). Global technology giants such as Google, Samsung 
and Microsoft have all established a presence in Kenya in recent years, owing to its 
modernised ICT environment (Munyua 2016). Since 2012, the social media environment has 
witnessed the exponential growth of one new entrant in particular—WhatsApp—now the 
most popular social networking platform. One report (BAKE 2017) indicates that in 2018, 
WhatsApp had more than 12 million users in Kenya, compared to seven million for Facebook 
and 2.2 million for Twitter (CA 2018). The growth of WhatsApp groups can be both public 
and private. The former is normally where the link is posted on popular websites for public 
access and joining. The latter is where access is limited to links to any existing group 
member.  
 
Social media platforms, such as WhatsApp, have already become key sources of news for 
young people especially (BAKE 2017). Traditionally, such younger citizens rarely pay 
attention to news disseminated from the mainstream media outlets (Otieno and Mukhongo 
2013). However, the interface between mainstream media and social media discussion is 
increasingly evident even in new social media platforms. Whatsapp has joined other social 
networking sites by providing a myriad of discussion groups and digital public spaces for 
political and social issue discussion. Political news stories posted from both online and 
 
mainstream media outlets in the WhatsApp groups often generate huge online discussions. 
Nevertheless, research tends to indicate that only interested, pro-active and already engaged 
individuals are inclined or motivated to join such groups (Brites 2014; Enjolras, Steen-
Johnsen, and Wollebæk 2013; Fabbrini 2013; Kim and Kim 2017). Hence, new social media 
platforms are generally seen as strengthening the position of the already engaged to further 
participate in political debates and discussion rather than reaching new audiences for politics. 
In the case of Kenya specifically, though, there has been limited empirical research 
conducted on the rise of SNS and its potential impact on political discussion. Below we set 
out a series of hypotheses drawing on existing theoretical work to examine the potential of 
SNS in terms of network heterogeneity and polarisation in Kenya. 
  
Social Networking Sites and Social Network Heterogeneity 
First hypothesis: WhatsApp as a social networking site is reflective of the social network 
heterogeneity of its users. 
 
The premise of this hypothesis is that when social networking sites are characterised by a 
high degree of social networking heterogeneity, incidental exposure becomes inevitable. 
Consequently, selective exposure to information is minimised or made impossible. Following 
the proliferation of social networking sites, varied propositions have been promoted regarding 
the individual practice of selective exposure (Zhang et al. 2010; Ponder and Haridakis 2015) 
and how it shapes the formation of public opinions including the potential for polarisation.  
 
Cognitive dissonance is one of the theoretical propositions used to explain the issue of 
selective exposure (Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2013). Studies have, indeed, indicated that 
individuals are more likely to select sources of information consistent with their partisan 
perspectives and political predispositions (Lee et al. 2014; Wicks, Wicks, and Morimoto 
2014). They also are more likely to seek out political information about issues that they are 
interested in. Various scholars have argued that when individuals are continuously exposed to 
like-minded political information congruent with their existing ideologies, the desire to 
remain with homogeneous social networks is also heightened (Zhang et al.  2010; Lee et al. 
2014; Ponder and Haridakis 2015). This is, according to Zhang et al.  (2010), in part 
facilitated by the availability and flexibility in selecting political information in new media. If 
citizens are exposed to less diverse political communications then the ramifications for 
democracy are potentially damaging. For instance, Sunstein suggests that the use of SNSs 
 
will eventually lead to what he calls “isolated enclaves of like-minded individuals” (2007, 4). 
Similarly, Brynjolfsson and Van Alstyne (2007) argue that such SNSs participants through a 
process called cyber-balkanisation establish echo chambers that discuss, process and interact 
based on their selected issues and individuals. In short, the fear is that continuing exposure to 
like-minded ideologies risks fragmenting society into competing and polarised factions which 
become less accommodative of divergent opinions and acrimonious towards those who hold 
contrary political opinions (Pattie and Johnston 2016; Stroud 2010).   
 
Despite these well-articulated fears, though, some empirical studies have indicated that social 
networking sites have precisely the opposite effects and instead increase the probability that 
individuals will encounter diverse political information and viewpoints (Ponder and 
Haridakis 2015; Messing and Westwood 2014). Research has also suggested that even though 
individuals might well seek out opinions that are in line with their own, this does not entail 
systematically and actively sacrificing exposure to divergent political opinions. Nir (2011) 
found that individuals are more likely, in social networking sites, to come across political 
divergence even when the intention to do so does not exist. The structural advantages and 
features of social networking sites include their porous borders (Loader and Mercea 2011) 
and blurred boundaries (Brundidge 2010). Such porosity can, however, be limited by 
platform features such as “unfriending” individuals, blocking people bearing divergent views 
(Kim, Hsu, and de Zúñiga 2013), or exiting groups in the case of WhatsApp. Nevertheless, 
when SNSs users expand their sphere of friendship beyond their immediate communities the 
probability of encountering diversity of exposure is increased (Bojanowski and Corten 2014). 
 
Whilst selective exposure is often seen as crucially important, additional research has focused 
on the response to information received. Such studies have indicated that individuals 
sometimes reject others based on their political orientations on social media (Pénard and 
Poussing 2010; Weeks et al. 2017; Yamamoto and Kushin 2014). Alternatively, when users 
are exposed to divergent opinions on social media, they typically ignore such posts (Loader, 
Vromen, and Xenos 2014; Vissers and Stolle 2014). Studies have also found a positive 
correlation between conventional (offline) social networks, the heterogeneity of such 
networks and exposure to diverse perspectives (Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2013; Price et 
al. 2002). Our research here, therefore, seeks to establish if this exposure to diverse 
information in social networking sites is incidental to social network heterogeneity. 
 
 
Mediatory Effects of SNSs and Social Network Heterogeneity 
Second hypothesis: Social networking site usage, including posting political news, obtaining 
political news and commenting about political news, influences social network heterogeneity. 
 
The premise of this hypothesis is that when social networking sites consist mainly of a 
homogenous category of individuals, the consumption, discussion and posting of news within 
the groups incidentally exposes them to heterogeneous opinions. This creates a form of social 
network heterogeneity based on information exposure. According to Eveland and Hively 
(2009), frequent users of social networking sites are more likely to have deeply 
heterogeneous networks online. As they engage in political activities that demand 
interactions, individuals exchange information and express opinions with diverse people in 
ways that create connections and bonds (Buglass et al. 2016). Through SNSs, individuals can 
engage in various activities of information exchange including socialisation, entertainment 
and political discussions. Informational exchanges on social media such as posting messages, 
commenting and political discussions have been predicted to then enhance the diversity of 
information exchanged (Eveland and Hively 2009; Kim and Chen 2015; Scheufele et al. 
2006). The explanation is that SNSs function as information hubs allowing users to exchange 
and share information (Zhang et al.  2010). Frequent users of SNSs have a tendency to be 
involved more in discursive informational exchange and connection (Pattie and Johnston 
2016). The basis of this argument is that news shared on those platforms originates from a 
multiplicity of sources on varied political and public affairs which SNS users can easily pick 
and discuss (Buglass et al. 2016). Such discussion then further teases out diverse perspectives 
that facilitate exposure to multiple viewpoints. This can be done by “liking” the comments, 
adding to the trail of comments and interjections about the issues being discussed. Some 
researchers (Brundidge 2010; Kim, Chen, and de Zúñiga 2013; Lee et al. 2014) have found 
that frequent participation in political discussion on social networking sites potentially leads 
to more heterogeneous networks. This is what Weeks et al. (2017) term incidental exposure. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that social and political issues elicit the most diverse 
contribution from SNSs users (Rojas and Puig-i-Abril 2009). For example, it has been found 
that using Facebook to post news, express opinions and to socialise with friends influenced 
the extent to which individuals were willing to change their habits (Zhang et al. 2010) and 
engage in more political discussion especially with diverse “others” (Garrett, Carnahan, and 
Lynch 2013). Further studies have, indeed, confirmed that political messaging affects the 
relationship between use of SNSs and the deliberate exposure to political heterogeneity 
 
(Pattie and Johnston 2016). Our study here notes that where social networking sites have an 
element of social network heterogeneity, then more interaction with news through posting, 
commenting and discussion enhances further heterogeneity. 
 
Social Network Heterogeneity and Polarisation 
Third hypothesis: An association exists between social network heterogeneity and 
polarisation (ethnic, party and ideological polarisation).  
 
The basis of this hypothesis is that when a high degree of social network heterogeneity exists 
in a SNS, then less ethnic, party and ideological polarisation should be experienced. The 
relationship between the use of media and political polarisation has been found to revolve 
around exposure to similar or dissimilar viewpoints (Kim and Kim 2017; Kim and Chen 
2015; Rathnayake and Winter and 2017; Vaccari et al. 2015). Furthermore, the more 
individuals were exposed to diverse political perspectives, the more accommodating they 
were to politically diverse “others” (Vaccari et al. 2015). The majority of the literature that 
has studied political polarisation has focused on an individual’s partisan political affiliations 
(Gustafsson 2012) and their patterns of media use (Lee et al. 2014). Other scholars have also 
focused on the structure and nature of societies and conventional social networks as one key 
influence of political polarisation (Stroud 2010). To explain attitudinal polarisation among 
individuals, the structure of social networks tends to influence their informational 
environment through the diffusion of political messages (Ljepava et al. 2013). Individuals 
who exist in heterogeneous environments where exchange of information occurs among 
diverse people are more exposed to diverse perspectives (Xu, Liu, and You  2011). 
 
Research looking at the influence of exposure to dissimilar opinions on political polarisation 
has elicited mixed findings and reactions. There are various groups of theoretical positions in 
this regard. The first one proposed by deliberative theorists posits that communications in 
diverse settings has a depolarising influence on individuals (Carpini., Cook, and Jacobs 2004; 
Kim 2015). These theorists argue that the sharing of dissimilar opinions raises political 
disagreements, which in turn challenges individuals to engage in a deliberative critical 
thinking process (Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004). Consequently, individuals are challenged 
to take opposing views into consideration with the result that it fosters political 
comprehension of diverse perspectives (Binder et al. 2009). According to Weir, Toolan, and 
Smeed (2011), this eventually induces convergence of ideology through the modification of 
 
political views. Notably, empirical research has suggested that exposure to different 
viewpoints tends to enhance awareness, and tolerance, of the legitimate arguments regarding 
opposite political perspectives (Johnson et al. 2013; Wicks, Wicks, and Morimoto 2014). It 
has also been claimed that heterogeneous social networks depolarise individuals’ attitudes as 
regards political parties in established democracies like the UK and US (Osatuyi 2013).  
 
The second, alternative, perspective is confirmation bias. This is where individuals accord 
unequal weights and attention to information that corroborates their initial positions and 
beliefs (Lee et al. 2014; Wojcieszak 2010). Consequently, exposure to dissimilar viewpoints 
simply magnifies pre-existing political orientation and produces further extreme positions 
(Chong and Druckman 2007) despite seeking an apparent diversity of political information 
(Mouakket 2015).  
 
A series of different factors, therefore, are pertinent in understanding how social network 
heterogeneity might translate into polarisation. First, those who possess a high degree of 
exposure to political information more easily take part in political discussions (Binder, 
Howes, and Smart 2012). Additionally, the influence of political information that one then 
encounters on social networks depends on the depth and level of discussion that individuals 
engage in (Buglass et al. 2016). This means that the simple act of being exposed to diverse 
political views doesn’t necessarily mean that information will be allocated more weight as 
regards to determining one’s political opinions and viewpoints. Second, reflective thinking is 
stimulated when individuals in social networks try to make sense of new ideologies they 
encounter through discussion (Johnson et al. 2013). The frequency of such discussions affects 
the criticality and usefulness of information encountered within individual networks (Garrett, 
Carnahan, and Lynch 2013). People tend to comprehend new information more easily and 
carefully as they anticipate discussion with those of opposing viewpoints (Lee 2012). 
Therefore, the relationship between social network heterogeneity and the polarisation of 
opinions is also determined by the frequency of political discussions individuals have on 
daily basis (Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2013; Lee 2012). Constant exposure may mean 
desensitisation and thus less polarisation.  
 
Methodology 
To operationalise the three hypotheses outlined above, a cross-sectional survey of 
respondents from two Kenyan counties was used. The WhatsApp-friendly survey achieved a 
 
total of 226 respondents via WhatsApp platforms, representing a response rate of 11.9 per 
cent. Respondents were derived from public WhatsApp group forums through online 
invitation links related to Nakuru and Nairobi counties. The two counties were selected due 
to their cosmopolitan nature. Eleven WhatsApp groups with governance and political titles 
were then selected. Owing to the 256-membership cap, research was only carried out in 
WhatsApp groups with capacity for the researcher to join. With administrator’s 
acknowledgements, followed by a short introduction of the research purpose to members, 
random probability sampling was used to select individual respondents from the various 
WhatsApp groups. This was followed by an invitation to selected respondents to join the 
researcher’s WhatsApp group. Having clicked and joined the group, respondents accessed the 
survey from the platform. A consent form was attached at the beginning of the survey before 
they proceeded to answer the survey questions. Through a selective deletion formula, missing 
cases were removed from the survey and the quality of data was enhanced.  
 
Measuring Social Network Heterogeneity 
To measure social network heterogeneity in the WhatsApp group we profiled participants 
according to the following: gender (male/female), ethnicity (tribal identification—Kikuyu, 
Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya), class (living standard measure),1 party affiliation (Jubilee, NASA, 
AMANI, etc.), region of origin (different sub-counties demarcation) and religious 
identification (Muslim, Christian, other). A variance index score was then established for 
each of the six variables. This was then aggregated to summarise the six variables under 
study as relates to social network heterogeneity (SD = 6.23, M = 10.33, Range = 0–16, 
Cronbach’s = 0.79). Having graded the diversity elements above, respondents were also 
asked if social network heterogeneity existed in their WhatsApp group. 
 
Measuring the Use of WhatsApp 
The use of WhatsApp was measured by asking the amount of time (hours; range two-hourly) 
individuals spent using  it (Ellison, Lampe, and Steinfield 2007). Ten time slots were 
combined into one single factor and averaged to create an index of WhatsApp use 
(Cronbach’s alpha ¼ 0.84, M ¼ 2.07, SD ¼ 0.65). Various dimensions of WhatsApp use 
were also considered, including posting of new items, commenting on news and discussing 
politics. Each of the items stated above was measured through one question—the frequency 
                                                 
1 Low income (less than Sh484,000/annum), lower-middle class (Sh484,000–Sh748,000/annum), middle class 
(Sh748,000–Sh3.69 million/annum), upper-middle class (above Sh3.69 million/annum). 
 
with which individuals engaged in each activity using WhatsApp (talking politics: M = 1.20, 
SD = 0.79, range = 0–2; posting news: M = 1.54, SD = 1.00, range = 0–2; getting news: M = 
1.15, SD = 1.07, range = 0–2). How frequently respondents were exposed to diverse news 




Three types of polarisation, (ethnic, ideological and party), were measured using methods 
adopted and contextualised from Pattie and Johnston (2016) and Stroud (2010). Ethnic 
polarisation was measured through the identification of the ethnic origins and the variance in 
political opinions that are held in view of one’s ethnic inclinations. Respondents were 
required to qualify statements including “individuals in my WhatsApp group make arguments 
in support of their ethnic tribe” and “ethnicity issues come up in many political discussions in 
our WhatsApp group.” Answers were ranked on a 5-point scale ranging from one (strongly 
disagree) to five (strongly agree). The scores on the five items were averaged to formulate an 
index of ethnic polarisation (Cronbach’s alpha ¼ 0.83, M ¼ 2.88, SD ¼ 0.57). Ideological 
polarisation targeted specifically cherished beliefs around the dispensation of county 
resources. Ideological polarisation was connected to four themes: resource management; 
favouritism; access to resources and efficacy. Examples of such statements included: “Our 
county resources are not well managed”; “favouritism in resource distribution exists at the 
county level”; “I have no say in how county government distributes development resources.” 
Similarly, responses were ranked on a 5-point scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The scores on the five items were averaged to formulate an index of 
ideological polarisation (Cronbach’s alpha ¼ 0.81, M ¼ 3.82, SD ¼ 0.67). Party polarisation 
using a model similar to the feeling thermometer index of political parties (Lee et al. 2014) 
measured the level of polarisation. Some questions included the following: “individuals in 
my WhatsApp group support all their party manifesto whether good or bad”; “the most 
heated discussions in my WhatsApp group are party related arguments.” Respondents were 
asked to report on a 5-point scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly 
agree). The five items were combined into a single factor, and the items were averaged to 




An ordinary least squares regression model was used to understand the relationship between 
heterogeneity factors as predictor variables and social network heterogeneity as the response 
variable. The first hypothesis was whether WhatsApp as a social networking site is reflective 
of the social network heterogeneity of its users. In this respect, the analysis in Table 1 below 
presents the heterogeneity factors with social network heterogeneity. The results indicate that 
the majority of variables positively contributed to social network heterogeneity of the various 
WhatsApp groups surveyed.  
 
Table 1: Regression analysis of social media network heterogeneity, unstandardised (SE)a 
Predictor Variable SNSs Network Heterogeneity 
Respondent’s age     −0.09 (0.02)** 
Gender identity −0.23 (0.41) 
Ethnic identity  0.57 (0.03)* 
Religious identity 0.47 (0.02)* 
Level of education    0.45 (0.023)* 
Party affiliation   0.13 (0.05)* 
Region of origin     0.50 (0.00)** 
Political discussion   0.65 (0.43)* 
Class identity   0.43 (0.04)* 
SNSs size 0.10 (0.00) 
Social network heterogeneity  1.00 (0.00)*** 
 N = 226, R2 = 0.19. 
The **values in brackets show the statistical 
significance  
 
 *p < .05. **p < .005. ***p < .001 
 
 
Ethnic identity, level of education, party affiliation, region of origin, political discussion, 
class identity, and size of social networking site contributed positively to the social 
networking heterogeneity of the WhatsApp group. This means that for every unit increase in 
the number of ethnic identities within the social networking site, the level of social network 
heterogeneity increases by 0.57 and is statistically significant. The same interpretation applies 
to all other variables including religious identity, where a unit increase in the number of 
religious identities on the WhatsApp group results in 0.47 increase in social networking 
heterogeneity—a significant value. The same positive relationship exists for party affiliation 
(0.13) where the value is significant. The only two variables that impact social networking 
heterogeneity in a negative way are age and gender. Understandably, age is less of an 
influence on the degree of social networking heterogeneity due to the demographic profile of 
 
average social media users and political participants in Kenya. However, gender is a very 
critical component of social network heterogeneity. This negative value for gender (-0.23), 
which is not statistically significant, is somewhat puzzling. Despite being statistically 
insignificant, gender is a critical component of social network heterogeneity and further 
research is needed to understand this outcome.  
 
The findings also reveal an important element of Kenyan sociopolitical fabric—that a 
randomised grouping in social networking sites largely reflects the social network 
heterogeneity in society in terms of the religious, political, ideological, class, regional and 
ethnic components. The above findings, therefore, have a bearing on the use of public 
WhatsApp groups as echo chambers or to enhance individuals’ selective exposure as 
discussed by Eveland and Hively (2009) and Ponder and Haridakis (2015). 
 
The second hypothesis was that the usage of social networking sites, including posting, 
obtaining and commenting on political news influences social network heterogeneity. Testing 
this relationship involved looking at two aspects: the first is direct and the second is the 
indirect techniques of analysis. This research employed direct tests as used by Binder, 
Howes, and Smart (2012) to understand the mediating relationship by looking at the degree 
of changes in the association between the independent variables. According to Carter et al. 
(2014), this method of analysis creates a number of advantages; it allows testing of multiple 
intervening variables while at the same time controlling the association between the variables 
themselves. Owing to the three mediators (posting, discussing, and commenting) considered 
in this hypothesis, the analysis used a multiple mediation analysis with a 95 per cent 
confidence interval of the relationship with the three mediating variables.  
 
Table 2: WhatsApp and social network heterogeneity: Posting, discussing and commenting 
as mediating factors 
 
Activity Use of WhatsApp Social Network Heterogeneity 
Posting news 0.34* 0.66* 
Political discussion 0.50* 0.48* 
Commenting on news 0.56* 0.44* 
N = 226   
 
The analysis indicated that the effects of use of social networking sites on the SNSs network 
heterogeneity variable was largely influenced by the specific SNS usage patterns of the 
 
individual users. The results in Table 2 above interpretatively mean that a 34 per cent 
increase in the use of WhatsApp for posting news will contribute to a 66 per cent increase in 
social network heterogeneity. This strongly suggests that posting news in public WhatsApp 
groups increases exposure to diverse perspectives. News originates from politically diverse 
mainstream sites and creates the incidental exposure referred to above. Although individuals 
may intentionally and consciously avoid information contrary to what they believe, exposure 
to counter-attitudinal political information can be inevitable in open WhatsApp groups. A 50 
per cent increase in the use of WhatsApp for political discussions translates to a 48 per cent 
increase in social network heterogeneity. Thus, discussion in SNSs also allows individuals to 
inadvertently encounter and discover opinion-challenging information online. This happens 
unless conscious efforts are made to avoid it. A 56 per cent increase in news commenting 
translates to a 44 per cent increases social network heterogeneity. Collectively, these results 
mean a lack of network heterogeneity in a social networking site can be mediated to some 
extent by the consumption, commenting and discussion of news from diverse news platforms. 
This is important because individuals then become exposed to varied perspectives, 
viewpoints and opinions which they would otherwise miss in echo-chamber settings. These 
results support the findings of Binder, Howes, and Smart (2012)  who found that news 
packaging for online platforms are brief, inviting and often controversial in an enticing way, 
which attracts interactive commenting and discussion. On platforms like WhatsApp, the 
threat of controversial discussion and topics are often hard to ignore. Hence, as Thelwall 
(2009) has commented, the evaluation of content by users is shaped through active 
contributions and political discussion over SNSs. According to Kim, Chen, and de Zúñiga  
(2013), social media activities like commenting, tagging and posting potentially promote 
exposure to diverse information and, consequently, enhance network heterogeneity among 
individuals. The results, therefore, support the second hypothesis. 
 
The third hypothesis was that an association exists between social network heterogeneity and 
polarisation (ethnic, party and ideological polarisation). To test this hypothesis, the analysis 
used three dependent variables to measure the level of polarisation: ethnic polarisation, 
ideological (around resources) polarisation and party polarisation. The results of this 




Table 3: Regression analysis on use of WhatsApp, social networking heterogeneity and 
polarisation 





Respondents age      -0.11 (0.02)***      -0.24(0.02)***      -0.17 (0.02)*** 
Gender (male and female) -0.23 (0.41) -0.23 (0.41) -0.23 (0.41) 
Ethnic identity    0.74 (0.03)*    0.22 (0.13)*  0.65 (0.02)* 
Religious identity 0.07 (0.10)  0.14 (0.25) 0.43 (0.22) 
Level of education  0.32 (0.03)  0.33 (0.12) 0.21 (0.31) 
Party affiliation  0.15 (0.18)  0.19 (0.65) 0.63 (0.05) 
Region of origin  0.25 (0.51) 0.25(0.56) 0.50 (0.41) 
Political discussion    0.32 (0.26)*    0.17 (0.32)*   0.54 (0.42)* 
Class ideology   0.54(0.24)*    0.67 (0.04)*   0.54 (0.24)* 
SNSs size -0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Posting news -0.19 (0.05)  -0.23 (0.17) -0.09 (0.43) 
Commenting on news       -0.44 (0.12)***       -0.55 (0.12)***       -0.61 (0.12)*** 
Social network 
heterogeneity 
  0.35 (0.07)*    0.44(0.01)*    0.43 (0.00)* 
R²    
N = 226, list-wise. R2 = 
0.19. 
 *p < .05. **p < 
.01.  
***p < .001   
  
The study found that the various aspects of social network heterogeneity in WhatsApp groups 
affect the three levels of polarisation in different magnitudes, as noted in Table 3 above. 
Evidently, various heterogeneity factors like ethnic identity, religious identity, party 
affiliation, region of origin, class ideology and political discussion significantly influenced 
ethnic, ideological and party polarisation. It is also critical to consider how ethnic identity 
influences ethnic polarisation, where the value 0.74 is significant, class ideology influences 
ideological polarisation around resources, where the value 0.67 is significant, and party 
affiliation influenced party polarisation, with the value 0.63 being statistically significant as 
well. Ultimately, the aggregated social networking heterogeneity which is a combination of 
all variables was found to influence the different forms of polarisation in varied magnitudes 
as well. For ethnic polarisation, the value 0.35 is statistically significant. This means that a 
unit increase in social networking heterogeneity increases ethnic polarisation by 0.35 units. A 
unit increase in social networking heterogeneity leads to a 0.44 unit increase in ideological 
polarisation (P = 0.01 ≤ 0.05) and the same applies to party affiliation, with the value 0.43 
being statistically significant. Considering the above findings, it is important to point out that 
a randomised collection of WhatsApp group members in a county platform naturally attracts 
heterogeneous individuals. The results in Table 3 above, therefore, indicate that polarisation 
is inevitable in SNS platforms that reflect the composition of the societies that they exist in. 
 
The argument by Pattie and Johnston (2016) that any form of heterogeneity creates the 
potential for polarisation is strongly supported. However, the extent of polarisation depends 
on many factors, including the context and culture around which such social networking sites 
are formed. This evidently happens regardless of the type of SNSs platform. 
 
Discussion 
The focus of this research has been to examine whether WhatsApp as a social networking site 
is reflective of the social network heterogeneity of its users. Second, we sought to understand 
how the usage of social networking sites, including posting political news, obtaining political 
news and commenting about political news, influences social network heterogeneity. Lastly, 
we analysed whether any association exists between social network heterogeneity and 
polarisation. The analysis and findings show that the randomised composition of WhatsApp 
groups through public links does, indeed, reflect a form of social network heterogeneity. 
Heterogeneity in WhatsApp groups is reflected in terms of gender, religious identity, ethnic 
identity, class identity, party affiliation and region of origin. Unlike close-knit, echo chamber 
like social networks, public WhatsApp groups afford a diversity that is reflective of the 
societal composition of cosmopolitan counties. Social network heterogeneity is critical and its 
potential to influence political discussions, participatory interests and efficacy is a subject 
that has been least studied. Some scholars have, however, found that the diverse composition 
of SNS platforms means multiple sources of information (Eveland and Hively 2009) and 
alternative perspectives (Dylko 2013) abound, both of which are important in enhancing 
political discussions and participatory interests. Kim, Chen, and de Zúñiga (2013) noted that 
diversity in SNS platforms is a proxy for the prevalence of divergent and often conflicting 
political values and views. Public displays of personal political stances and positions may 
yield social disapproval according to Buglass et al. (2016) and can result in interpersonal 
conflict due to likely disagreements (Hyun and Kim 2015). However, these arguments fail to 
distinguish between political activities on SNS and the process of image management and 
self-presentation. This happens when what an individual presents on their SNS platforms is 
not what they believe in or stand for (Touré-Tillery and Fishbach 2014) and this is done to 
receive peer approval or to hide their unpopular perspectives. These findings are consistent 
with those of Lee et al. (2014) who found that frequent use of social networking sites such as 
Facebook or Twitter predisposes individuals to having diverse networks. The diverse 
networks are created by the nature of the formation and the interaction within the platform 
and sometimes this happens without an individual’s control. Importantly, SNS heterogeneity 
 
facilitates incidental exposure to new and diverse information as argued by Tewksbury, 
Weaver, and Maddex (2001). The effect of this on an individual and to the process of 
political participation is critical. Heterogeneous viewpoints enhance cognitive reappraisal of 
currently held positions and views (Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). This ideally stimulates 
further information-seeking behaviour among individuals from other platforms, including 
traditional news outlets. The findings indicate that posting, discussing and commenting on 
political news influence social network heterogeneity to some degree. WhatsApp as a SNS 
has altered information exposure dynamics and patterns, which in turn has affected the social 
network heterogeneity. Being an open social network, public WhatsApp groups’ 
heterogeneous composition of individual members creates an opportunity to incidentally 
encounter news and political information from other news sites. This, it should be noted, is 
different from private, end-to-end encrypted WhatsApp groups whose admission is based on 
selective associations determined by the user. Similar to other SNSs, exposure to divergent 
views happens through comments, posts and discussions. With other digital interactive 
capabilities like videos, memes, clips, news and sound bites, WhatsApp has added another 
platform to sociopolitical participation dynamics. The rapid growth of and interconnectivity 
between social media platforms are more likely to positively influence and facilitate deeper 
forms of diversity within the SNS networks. For example, within Facebook, it is possible to 
join WhatsApp, Twitter and Instagram links. Inevitably, individuals will find it harder to 
avoid exposure to general social network heterogeneity. This can potentially reduce the so-
called echo-chamber effect in online platforms. However, the risk associated with more 
heterogeneity in such groups is that the platform will be characterised by diverse and often 
conflicting norms, practices, values and expectations (Yamamoto and Kushin 2014). Whilst 
some studies have linked high levels of heterogeneity with increased political participation 
(Boulianne 2015; Kahne and Bowyer 2018; Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014), others have 
linked it with intergroup anxiety where individuals are guarded when presenting their 
opinions for fear of hurting others (Li and Chen 2014). Heterogeneity in SNSs as related to 
demographic composition, private or professional relationships and kinship seems to predict 
higher levels of online tension (Parsons 2010).  
 
The findings outlined above indicate that heightened social network heterogeneity in SNSs 
does not necessarily mean that individuals become less polarised, more receptive and open-
minded. It equally does not mean that they will be more moderate in their attitudes toward 
political matters, especially in historically polarised contexts like Kenya. These arguments 
 
are well reflected in the findings regarding the third hypothesis that indicates that social 
network heterogeneity influences party, ideological and ethnic polarisation. Further online-
based polarisation presents a potent danger for Kenyans. Due to the legal implications of 
propagating hate and polarisation in offline contexts, studies reveal that it is increasingly 
moving online (Freedom House 2012; Ndlela and Mulwo 2017; Snow and Taylor 2015). This 
is likely to aggravate tensions in countries like Kenya where the social fabric is already 
fragile. It is, however, important to note that activities in social media are not unidimensional. 
The various forms of polarisations evident in the study indicate that social networking sites 
have a different influence and manifestation upon each type. While the research by Lee et al. 
(2014) found no direct evidence of a link between social media network heterogeneity and 
the level of opinion polarisation, this study goes further, indicating that this evidence exists in 
Kenya in a more categorical way. It will be increasingly important to understand how (or 
whether) polarisation (party, ideological and ethnic) can be mediated by regulated political 
discussion. This will, however, depend on whether such political discussions are 
characterised by meaningful engagement marked by stringent moderation and careful 
consideration of information. If this doesn’t happen, it is possible that biased information 
processing will happen. Pre-existing prejudices will crowd objective discussions and deeper 
polarisation will be reignited. It would indeed be interesting to see how knowledge mediates 
the relationship between social network heterogeneity and polarisation. Although not within 
the scope of this study, research has shown that when individuals are more knowledgeable, 
they are likely to move to more extreme issue positions and hence create more polarisation 
(Mutahi and Kimari 2017).  
 
Having considered the above findings, it is evident that WhatsApp as a SNS has clearly 
reflected aspects of social network heterogeneity and this has influenced various forms of 
polarisation. Nevertheless, it is important to note of some of the limitations of our study. The 
associations detected among the various variable pursued in the study are not necessarily 
suitable for making claims of causal inferences. While the study attempted to measure 
concepts like polarisation with statistical precision, the interpretation and understanding of 
such constructs are debatable. A further limitation is that political commenting, discussion 
and posting were measured as related to their frequency. It did not consider the attributes and 
dynamics of political discussion. This makes the measuring of political discussion effects 




By looking at WhatsApp, this study has extended the technological and geographical focus of 
research on social networking sites and polarisation. Much of the existing research on SNSs’ 
heterogeneity has concentrated on Twitter and Facebook in particular. To some extent this 
also reflects the geographical bias inherent in much of the current research on political 
polarisation which concentrates largely on North America and Northern Europe. Our findings 
based on WhatsApp platforms present both similar and divergent aspects of social network 
heterogeneity and polarisation. With its new features, allowing its use as an instant messaging 
and a social networking site, WhatsApp presents news affordances slightly unique when 
compared to Twitter and Facebook. This illustrates the need to be alert to both technological 
and contextual differences when studying social network heterogeneity and polarisation. This 
also applies to assumption on SNS adoption and impacts as regards to polarisation. The 
geographical contexts, SNS features/affordances and the characteristics of online social 
networks in these platforms are crucial aspects that drive how and whether SNS influence 
polarisation. Furthermore, research on polarisation needs to do more than just examine 
network linkages and assume that the homogeneity/heterogeneity of networks leads to more 
or less polarisation respectively. It is important to understand not just the characteristics of 
the networks but how people use SNSs, the information received via these platforms and the 
interpretation of such material are crucial to shaping patterns of polarisation. 
 
The Kenyan context offers further insights to the SNS-polarisation discussion. Whereas much 
of the existing popular discussion of polarisation in Western countries centres on how 
technology might be responsible for heightening divisions, what happens when a technology 
is added into an already highly polarised society such as Kenya? The research here suggests 
that similar to Western contexts, there is certainly a danger of emergent SNSs like WhatsApp 
heightening existing polarisation. Notably, in terms of political discussion online, without 
careful moderation, entrenched division and incivility are unlikely to add much to democratic 
discourse. This will become even more crucial given the growing popularity of WhatsApp 
platforms (and social media generally), especially amongst the young Kenyan population. 
There also exists considerable growth of parallel unofficial WhatsApp platforms to discuss 
county governance issues and owing to the end-to-end encryption features of WhatsApp, 
such groups are generally not open to public scrutiny. Finally, the Kenyan constitution places 
considerable formal emphasis on encouraging participation as a potential solution to 
governance problems. Social media and the Internet are often seen as important elements for 
 
fostering such participation amongst younger citizens. It may be that SNSs can indeed extend 
participation, but arguably more attention needs to focus on the quality and impact of 
expansion of both online and offline participatory platforms. 
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